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INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE
SUKÕK MUSHÓRAKAH                       
FOR PRIVATE SECTOR FUNDING
Abdou Diaw*, Obiyathulla Ismath Bacha** and
 Ahcene Lahsasna***
Abstract
Despite the huge potential on both the demand and supply sides 
of the ÎukËk market, the current ÎukËk structures fall short of 
adequately meeting the market’s needs as the SharÊ’ah compliance 
of many of them and/or their economic efficiency are questionable. 
Even though partnership-based ÎukËk are claimed to reflect the true 
spirit of Islamic finance, their underuse as a financing instrument 
is a notable fact. Such a situation, if not addressed, will impede 
the development of the ÎukËk market in the future. This paper 
proposes an innovative ÎukËk mushÉrakah model for consideration 
by companies and revenue generating infrastructure projects. The 
model has an incentive-compatible feature by making the share of 
the issuing entity in the profit positively related to its performance 
in addition to a convertibility clause. The sector Return on Equity 
(ROE), adjusted with the firm beta, is considered a benchmark for 
measuring the performance of the firm. The paper examines the 
design of the model, its risk return profile as well as its pricing for 
secondary market trading. The theoretical properties of the model 
are empirically validated through two types of simulations: Monte 
Carlo Simulation and backtesting. The proposed model constitutes 
a new class of financial security with respect to the residual nature 
of the claim and its limited tenor. It, thus, presents an opportunity 
for diversification. The model implies higher risk for the investor, as 
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neither the profit nor the capital is guaranteed–like common stock–
but the return is expected to be higher. The model would entail higher 
financial cost for companies–as compared to debt instruments–but it 
would imply at the same time lower probability of bankruptcy, since 
the ÎukËk are equity-based instruments. 
Keywords: ØukËk mushÉrakah, Monte Carlo Simulation, Backtesting, 
Risk-return, Incentive-compatible.
I. INTRODUCTION
On both the demand and supply sides of the ÎukËk market, the 
potential is high. On the demand side, there is an increasing amount 
of wealth accumulated in the hands of Muslim investors, particularly 
in the oil-rich Gulf countries, who are looking for investment vehicles 
that are in conformity with the rules of the SharÊÑah. The wealth in the 
hands of Middle Eastern High Net Worth Individuals (HNWI) alone 
was estimated at US$ 1.5 trillion in 2009 (GIFF, 2010: 32). Besides 
this category of investors, there are others who consider ÎukËk 
suitable instruments for ethical investment and diversification. The 
oversubscription of many ÎukËk issues provides additional testimony 
of the huge demand for this type of investment.  
On the supply side, there are a number of infrastructure projects 
in Muslim countries that require huge amounts of funds. The planned 
infrastructure projects in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries alone, from 2008 to 2013, amount to US$ 2 trillion (GIFF, 
2010: 31). A large number of the infrastructure projects in this region 
have been financed through ÎukËk issuance. Moreover, the recent 
crisis in the credit market gave many conventional governments and 
corporations additional reasons to diversify their sources of funding. 
This helps explain the increasing openness of many non-Muslim 
countries to Islamic finance. Also, Islamic financial institutions, 
which usually use the short-term funds on their liability side to 
finance their long-term assets, are in need of ÎukËk to manage this 
maturity mismatch (Standard & Poor, 2009).
Over the last decade, ÎukËk (sing. Îakk) have been seen as an 
alternative to interest-based financing in the Islamic capital market. 
ØukËk represent proportionate beneficial ownership of an asset 
or a pool of assets for a defined period when the risk and return 
associated with the cash flows generated by the underlying assets 
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are passed to the ÎukËk-holders (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007: 177). 
However, the euphoria that accompanied the phenomenal growth 
of the ÎukËk market has been tarnished by various criticisms raised 
about the SharÊÑah compliance and/or the economic efficiency of 
many of the current ÎukËk structures. Those criticisms culminated 
with the famous statement of Shaykh Taqi Usmani in 2007, declaring 
that 85% of the equity-based ÎukËk structures (i.e. mudhÉrabah/
mushÉrakah ÎukËk) at that period were not SharÊÑah compliant. As a 
consequence the issuance of equity-based ÎukËk drastically dropped 
in the subsequent years (IIFM, 2009). Given the prominent place that 
these equity-based contracts are expected to play in Islamic finance, 
their underutilization would constitute a clear impediment to the 
development of the industry. The objective of this paper is, therefore, 
to propose an innovative model of ÎukËk mushÉrakah for companies 
and revenue generating infrastructure projects that would overcome 
some of the issues found in the partnership-based contracts.   
Section II reviews the literature pertaining to the potentials of 
ÎukËk for the private sector and some of the relevant issues. We are 
of the view that some of the issues identified in the literature can 
be addressed using a number of pertinent ideas from conventional 
finance. Thus, the literature on convertible bonds will be revisited. 
Section III is concerned with the design, the pricing, and the SharÊÑah 
assessment of the proposed ÎukËk mushÉrakah model. The theoretical 
characteristics of this model of ÎukËk will be tested empirically using 
two types of simulations: Monte Carlo Simulation and backtesting 
method in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The principal message of this section is to point out the potentials of 
ÎukËk as a financing instrument for the private sector and to discuss 
the issues that could impede their realization. We have argued that to 
address these issues and take full advantage of the potential benefits 
we need to be innovative. Wisdom can be taken from anywhere, and 
conventional finance has some good aspects that would be useful to 
Islamic finance. In this regard, the concept of incentive-compatible 
contracts and, particularly, convertible bonds are explored. This 
concept presents opportunities for boosting the use of partnership 
contracts as a financing instrument in Islamic finance by addressing 
the potential agency problem found in them.
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A. ØukËk: Potential for the Private Sector, and the Issues Involved
Even though numerous and various issues have been identified in 
the ÎukËk market, we shall limit the review to those issues that are 
directly related to equity-based ÎukËk. Thus, we shall not discuss 
issues pertaining to the benchmarking of ÎukËk, and their tradability, 
as they are addressed in a separate paper. On the other hand, the 
discussion in this paper does not refer to any particular jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the legal and regulatory issues will not be examined, as 
they may vary from one jurisdiction to another.
i. Potentials of ØukËk for the Private Sector
Nisar (2007) identified three common uses of ÎukËk: project-specific, 
asset-specific, and balance sheet-specific. For the first two, funds can 
be raised by selling the ownership rights of a project or an existing 
asset to a group of investors who will be entitled to the cash flow 
thereof during a specified period. On the other hand, the potential 
of ÎukËk for liquidity and balance sheet management has drawn the 
attention of many authors. It is argued that, with a dynamic secondary 
market, the Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) could dispose of 
excess liquidity by purchasing ÎukËk; conversely, they could sell the 
ÎukËk when liquidity is needed. Furthermore, ÎukËk could ease out 
some of the gross asset/liability mismatches found in the balance 
sheets of most Islamic banks, since with ÎukËk it is possible to create 
immediate funding and use long-term assets to back it (Adam, 2005).
ii. Selected Issues in the ØukËk Market
Oh, Hwang and Heshmati (2009) discussed two forms of product 
efficiency: technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. In the price-
quality space, a product is technically efficient if it has higher quality 
for lower price. However, an efficient product may not be selected by 
consumers, even when it has the highest quality and lowest price. The 
reason is not the absolute level of quality, but a mix of qualities that 
does not match the consumer’s preference structure. The allocative 
efficiency refers to the degree of match of quality mix with the 
preference structure. Adopting these definitions and applying them 
to financial products, we can say that the ÎukËk product is technically 
efficient if it provides higher returns compared to other financial 
instruments with the same level of risk. Furthermore, we consider 
that tradability in addition to SharÊÑah compliance are essential 
constituents of allocative efficiency in the ÎukËk market. 
Abdou Diaw, Obiyathulla Ismath Bacha and Ahcene Lahsasna
43ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance • Vol. 4 • Issue 1 • 2012
Haneef (2009) identified three hallmarks in the development of the 
ÎukËk market. He showed that ÎukËk evolved from an asset-backed 
model, in which the ÎukËk-holders have ownership rights over the 
underlying asset as per the SharÊÑah requirements, to an asset-based 
model. With the latter model, the ÎukËk-holders rank pari passu with 
unsecured creditors. Indeed, for all international bonds there is a 
negative pledge that restricts the borrowing entity from issuing any 
bond in the future that is not in pari passu with existing unsecured 
bonds. The third stage of the ÎukËk structures evolution was marked 
by the emergence of models that were mainly based on partnership 
contracts but which violate some of their basic SharÊÑah requirements. 
Those structures in particular have drawn various criticisms that 
culminated with Shaykh Taqi Usmani’s declaration that 85% of those 
ÎukËk are SharÊÑah non-compliant. This led to the Accounting and 
Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions’ (AAOIFI) 
statement in 2008. 
To raise funds through ÎukËk, companies may use either sale-
based ÎukËk, lease-based ÎukËk or partnership-based ÎukËk (e.g. 
muÌÉrabah and mushÉrakah). The non-tradability of sale-based ÎukËk 
makes them unattractive to investors, as it drastically constraints their 
ability to exit the market when needed.1 The ijÉrah (lease-based) 
structure can be used by companies to acquire new asset; they can 
also use it by selling, leasing and buying-back some of their fixed 
assets. However, the latter variant of ijÉrah has come under attack 
from different Muslim scholars who consider the structure as mere 
legal trick (ÍÊlah) to circumvent the prohibition of borrowing on 
interest basis, as the combined contracts are just means for that end. 
Al-Amine (2008) analysed the structure of many of these combined 
contracts in the light of bayÑ al-wafÉ’2, bayÑ al-istighlÉl3 and bayÑ 
al-ÑÊnah.4 It is found that all these transactions are controversial and 
accepted by only a minority of Muslim jurists. Those who reject them 
consider these types of transaction as mere legal tricks whose form 
1 Within the Malaysian jurisdiction, sale-based sukËk are tradable since Malaysian 
scholars allow the sale of debt (bai’ al-dayn) which is not allowed in other 
jurisdictions.  
2 A transaction of sale of an estate with the condition that, in the future, the seller 
returns the cash and the buyer returns the estate.
3 It is a sale of real estate with the condition that the seller will lease out the estate and 
whenever he pays back the (same) price, he gets back his estate.
4 A contract which consists of a sale and buy-back. The price in one of the two 
transactions is paid cash while it is deferred for the other.
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may adhere to the requirements of the SharÊÑah in exchange contracts, 
while the substance does not (Al-Zuhayli, 2003; Al-Amine, 2008). 
In the same vein, Ali (2008) held that the combined contracts in the 
ÎukËk structures attempt to replicate conventional financial products 
while trying to remain within SharÊÑah bounds. The end result is 
complicated products that are hard to understand, costly to construct 
and implement and which may contradict the objectives of SharÊÑah. 
It can be argued that the complexity of a structure increases costs 
stemming from the need for more sophisticated legal documentation 
and more efforts for advertisement of the new product; as a result, the 
ÎukËk become less profitable, either for the investors or the issuers, 
or for both, which means a loss of efficiency in the technical sense. 
Furthermore, Siddiqi (2006) is of the view that, to ensure justice 
and fairness, the returns to ÎukËk should be linked to the actual 
productivity of the underlying asset.5 The rationale is that fairness 
requires that uncertainties attending upon productive enterprise be 
shared. At the same time, justice and fairness require that losses, if and 
when they occur due to the uncertainties in the business environment, 
should be borne by those who claim the profits when there are profits.
Partnership-based ÎukËk are potentially suitable to overcome the 
shortcomings of the two other types of structures mentioned above. 
Many Islamic economists see them as the most suitable financial 
instruments for the productive activities. However, financing products 
based on the concept of muÌÉrabah/mushÉrakah have never been 
popular in the industry. Obiyatulla (1997) has shown that muÌÉrabah 
financing has serious agency problems, lacks the bonding effect of 
debt financing, and can induce perverse incentives. He remarks that 
muÌÉrabah has the features of both equity (the claim is residual) and 
debt (the maturity is fixed). In addition, the rabb al-mÉl does not have 
the right to interfere in the business though he will bear the capital 
loss if it is not due to negligence.6 As a result, muÌÉrabah has the 
agency problem of both equity and debt, which can take the form of 
misreporting, misallocating costs and taking on overly risky projects. 
Other writers, while acknowledging the agency problem in muÌÉrabah, 
invoke additional factors related to attitudes and structures. Thus, 
5 Examples of such cases are sukūk intifÉÑ for the realization of Zam Zam Tower 
in Makkah and the Mushārakah Term Finance Certificates issued by a Pakistani 
conglomerate, Sitara Group.
6 This is the view of the majority of classical jurists. However, the ×anbalīs allow 
the rabb al-mÉl to participate in managerial decisions along with the muÌÉrib (See 
Kahf, 1997: 17).
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for the development of muÌÉrabah financing the current negative 
attitude of the Islamic bankers towards risk and long-term investment 
needs to be adjusted. Similarly, the structure of the institutions that 
are called upon to undertake muÌÉrabah financing should also be 
adjusted to accommodate its specificities (Hasan, 2002).
Besides these economic issues, some scholars have pointed out 
other problems pertaining to the fiqh (i.e. Islamic law) aspects of the 
equity-based structures. Al-Amine (2008) pointed out the controversy 
among Muslim scholars over the permissibility of one of the 
mushÉrakah partners giving an undertaking to purchase the shares or 
units of other partners at a predetermined price. The rationale for the 
objection is that the very nature of mushÉrakah is the sharing of profit 
and loss among the partners. The undertaking to purchase the share of 
a partner at a predetermined price defeats that spirit of mushÉrakah, 
as one partner will have a guaranteed return, whatsoever the outcome 
of the venture. 
Another issue which has drawn the attention of the scholars 
is the third party guarantee present in many ÎukËk structures. Al-
Amine (2008) argues that theoretically, a benevolent third party 
guarantee without fee or consideration can be acceptable in Islamic 
law. However, in practice guaranteeing the principal of ÎukËk is 
problematic. This is due to the fact that if the guarantee is provided by 
a government it shall be declared non-permissible to use the property 
of the whole community for the benefit of private entities. Likewise, 
it is hardly conceivable for a private entity to provide a benevolent 
guarantee to another entity without a consideration. 
An analysis of all these issues shows that the incongruence 
observed in the ÎukËk structures emanates from the desire to reconcile 
two different paradigms in financing. In the conventional setting, 
traditional debt financing allows the issuer to get funds without 
getting rid of some of its assets. On the other side, the investors 
get tradable securities whose return is determined ex ante. With 
the prohibition of interest in the Islamic framework, this form of 
financing (bonds) is not acceptable. Instead, methods endorsed by 
SharÊÑah entail either a profit-and-loss sharing scheme or transfer of 
an asset with all the rights and obligations. The incongruity arises 
when the SharÊÑah contracts are combined to reproduce the substance 
of a financial instrument that is repugnant to their nature and to the 
Islamic paradigm in finance. The literature that we have examined 
unveils that most of the innovation in the ÎukËk market has been more 
legal than financial; i.e., the forms and the legal documentations of 
the ÎukËk may be different from the existing instruments; however, 
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they are very much like the conventional debt instruments in terms of 
cash flow and risk return profile. 
Thus, as we have seen above, ÎukËk offer numerous potential 
benefits. However, these potential benefits could be hampered by 
the increasing controversies over the SharÊÑah compliance of many 
of the ÎukËk structures in the market. These controversies negatively 
affect the allocative efficiency of ÎukËk in the long term, as many 
pious Muslim investors would prefer to put their funds in other 
investment vehicles. A result of such a move would be a reduced 
investor base for ÎukËk that leads to higher required rate of return for 
the funds suppliers or higher cost of capital for issuers, translating 
into less efficiency in the technical sense. The above review points 
to a lack of adequate instruments in the corporate ÎukËk market to 
make the supply of ÎukËk meet the potentially high demand for them. 
Therefore, for sustainable growth, we argue that financial innovation 
is necessary, as is advocated by many Muslim economists who 
consider financial engineering a vital area for Islamic finance (See for 
instance, Obaidullah, 2005; Al-Suwailem, 2006; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
2007). In the next paragraphs we review selected literature pertaining 
to incentive-compatible contracts and convertible bonds, concepts 
that are of relevance to Islamic finance, as they share some common 
features with it. 
B. Dealing with the Agency Problem:
The Examples of Incentive-Compatible Contracts and
Convertible Bonds
Quite a lot of work dealing with the agency problem in financial 
markets can be found in the finance literature. The agency problem 
is a consequence of possible opportunistic behavior by an agent once 
the contract in a transaction has been concluded but the actions of the 
agent are unverifiable7 and the contract does not cover all possible 
contingencies. The agency problem may arise with the inherent 
incompatibility between the most common security types, namely 
common stocks and bonds. Stockholders can be considered risk takers. 
With the concept of limited liability they are entitled to unlimited 
potential gain while the most they may lose is their equity fund. On 
the other hand, debt holders can be seen as risk-averse investors. The 
most they can gain is the principal plus a fixed return. In the case of 
7  In the context of information asymmetry. 
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the firm’s default, if the realized cash flow of the firm is less than the 
principal, debt holders receive any cash flow from the firm. If the 
realized cash flow of the firm is greater than the principal, debt holders 
receive the principal plus interest and do not participate in any gains 
above that value. Because of this incompatibility, the managers who 
are supposed to serve the best interest of the shareholders may engage 
in risky investments that could increase the firm’s profitability but 
at the same time make the firm more vulnerable to financial distress 
(Loncarski, et al. 2006; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004).
The discussion in the conventional literature is based on debt 
and equity instruments. However, in the context of this study, the 
proposed ÎukËk, based on mushÉrakah, are not a debt instrument 
per se, though they have some of its features (e.g., the contract has 
a fixed maturity). Hence, the problem has a different form, as the 
claim of the sukËk-holders is residual and the maturity is fixed. Thus, 
the issuing company of ÎukËk mushÉrakah may misreport or may 
undertake projects with low returns in the initial stage and higher 
return in the later stage. With that scenario the ÎukËk-holders will 
be facing the same risk as the shareholders but will not enjoy the 
potential benefits of the projects which will accrue when the ÎukËk 
have expired. Furthermore, the company may misallocate the costs 
or misreport the profit that it realized. Incentive-compatible contracts 
may help mitigate the above form of agency problem.
Incentive-compatible contracts are thus devised to induce 
the agent to behave in the desired way. Some Islamic economists 
attempted to address the agency problem in muÌÉrabah through 
a variable profit-sharing ratio. Ahmad (2002) and Hasan (2002), 
each using different variables, derived a profit-sharing ratio which 
is positively related to the performance of the muÌÉrib. Both Hasan 
(2002) and Ahmad (2002) discussed the issue in the context of bank 
financing. The model proposed in this paper is discussed in the context 
of the capital market, and the variables considered are different from 
the ones employed by these two authors. 
Hasan (2002) derived a variable profit-sharing ratio that is a 
function of four variables: the rate of interest, the rate of profit (i.e. the 
ratio of profit to total capital), a risk premium and the leverage ratio 
(i.e. the ratio of the funds contributed by the financier to total capital). 
The model was built under the assumption that the profit-sharing 
ratio of the financier cannot be greater than his loss-sharing ratio. 
The interest rate in Hasan’s (2002) model renders its acceptability 
problematic in the context of Islamic finance. Moreover, it can be 
shown that ultimately the return to the financier is equal to the interest 
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rate and the risk premium; this makes the robustness of the model 
questionable. 
In Ahmad’s (2002) framework the profit-sharing ratio is a function 
of the risk-free rate of return of the financier, the amount of funds 
invested, the auditing expenses, a safety index (defined by the author) 
and the expected income from the investment. Besides the difficulty 
of defining a risk-free rate in Islamic finance, some variables in the 
models (safety index and expected income) are not observable and 
induce a degree of subjectivity to their determination. The inclusion 
of the auditing expenses also seems superfluous, as nowadays an 
external audit is systematically carried out for corporations in many 
jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, both studies lack empirical evidence to support the 
robustness of the model. Thus, in addition to choosing more objective 
variables as explained later, we conduct two types of simulations–
Monte Carlo and backtesting–to test the consistency of the model 
with its theoretical characteristics.
Convertible bonds may also help mitigate the risk arising from 
the agency problem, since they are hybrid instruments, which 
combine features of straight debt and equity. They are straight debt 
packaged with a call option on the firm’s equity, making it possible 
for convertible bondholders to participate in potential value gain 
sharing of the firm. This feature of convertible bonds makes them 
relatively insensitive to the risk of the issuing firm; while higher risk 
reduces the value of the straight debt component, it increases, at the 
same time, the value of the equity option component. For this reason 
investors are willing to pay more for a convertible bond than for a 
straight debt (Brennan and Schwartz, 1988). 
Based on the above arguments in favor of a convertibility clause, 
such a condition in the ÎukËk mushÉrakah could be an effective risk 
mitigating device for the agency problem. From a juristic point of 
view, a convertible ÎukËk should not constitute an issue in itself as it 
represents a ÎukËk with an embedded option. Tariq and Dar (2007) 
made a case for the SharÊÑah acceptability of embedded options as 
they do not create a situation of excessive gharar and at the same 
time they can be formulated in such a way to serve the purpose of 
fairness in Islamic finance.  
If we consider ‘embedded option’ as an additional condition 
to a contract, a case can be made for its permissibility as long as it 
is consistent with the injunctions of Islam and does not defeat the 
spirit of the contract in which it is involved. Indeed, the Prophet 
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(SAW) said: “Muslims are bound by their stipulations unless it be a 
condition which turns ÍarÉm (unlawful) into ÍalÉl (lawful) or ÍalÉl 
into ÍarÉm.” (See AbË DÉwËd, n.d., 3:332).
Based on the above discussions, we argue that ÎukËk mushÉrakah 
with an embedded option do not, in principle, contradict SharÊÑah 
rules and can mitigate the agency problem raised above.  Through 
the sukËk mushÉrakah the ÎukËk-holders are in a partnership with 
the issuing firm for a limited period. The convertibility clause gives 
them the right to prolong the partnership, at the end of the contract, to 
become shareholders of the company. In principle, nothing prevents 
the company at the end of the mushÉrakah contract to issue new shares 
even to non-ÎukËk-holders as long as it is done in a separate contract 
and all the terms of the new contract are in conformity with the 
SharÊÑah rules. Therefore, convertible ÎukËk mushÉrakah can be seen 
as a transaction consisting of two contracts executed separately at two 
different stages. The combination of different contracts is acceptable 
subject to certain conditions. Thus, after reviewing the works of the 
Muslim jurists on the question, ×ammÉd [2]8 derives three parameters 
that govern the permissibility of combining contracts:
• The combination should not violate an explicit text, like 
combining a sale and a loan.
• The combination should not be a means to a prohibited element. 
An example of this is bayÑ al-ÑÊnah where two sales are used to 
make a loan with interest.
• The combined contract should not contradict the nature and 
implications of the contracts involved. This may happen when 
the implications of the contracts involved contradict each other. 
This would be the case if, in muÌÉrabah, the capital is given to 
the muÌÉrib as a loan. In muÌÉrabah the capital is not guaranteed 
while in a loan the debtor is bound to return the capital.
Convertible ÎukËk are already present in the ÎukËk market. Dubai 
Port Convertible MushÉrakah ØukËk are one of the most prominent 
convertible ÎukËk, however the presence of the purchase undertaking 
in the structure made it subject to several controversies as discussed 
in a previous section (A, ii).
8 The authors with Arabic references will be cited with their names followed by the 
number indicating the rank of the paper in the Arabic References list.
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It is worth noting that the guidelines issued by the Islamic Financial 
Board Services (IFSB) on corporate governance for IFIs have dealt 
with the issue of protecting the rights of the depositors, as rabb 
al-mÉl, in Islamic banks. The guidelines’ recommendation that the 
agent needs to make timely and adequate disclosure of all material 
information is also relevant in this context. All these strategies 
and measures put together would reduce the agency problem to a 
minimum level.
III. SUKÕK MUSHÓRAKAH: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
A. The Economics and Mathematical Formulation
i. The Design of the Model
The model is based on the concept of mushÉrakah, which we will 
discuss later. By issuing the ÎukËk, the firm enters into a partnership 
contract with the ÎukËk-holders over the life of the ÎukËk. K
s
 is the 
capital contributed by the ÎukËk-holders whereas K
e
 is the book value 
of the total equity of the issuing firm. Thus the total capital K is:
K = K
s
 + K
e
. 
It is assumed that the firm does not have long-term debt; hence, after 
deducting the operating costs, the remaining amount of the revenue is 
to be shared by the equity-holders (i.e. shareholders) and the ÎukËk-
holders. It is further assumed that there are no retained earnings over 
the life of the ÎukËk.
There is a juristic consensus that loss that is not due to negligence 
should be borne according to capital contribution. On the other hand, 
Muslim jurists have different opinions regarding the way the profit-
sharing ratio is determined. In this study, we adopt the view that 
the profit-sharing ratio is according to the mutual agreement of the 
contracting parties. Here, the profit P referred to is operating profit; 
that is the remaining amount after deducting operating expenses from 
total revenue. It usually coincides with the Earnings before Interest 
and Tax (EBIT). 
Since the ÎukËk in this case have almost the same risk profile as the 
equity capital, in that neither the capital nor the return is guaranteed, 
it makes economic sense to consider the industry (sector) Return on 
Equity (ROE
i
) adjusted, to take into account the particularity of the 
firm, as a benchmark. Even though, from a legal perspective, the 
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relationship is between the firm and the ÎukËk-holders (as discussed 
later), from an economic viewpoint, the ÎukËk and equity have 
similar characteristics in terms of risk and return. In other words, the 
shareholders, like the ÎukËk-holders, do not perform any ‘work’; their 
entitlement to profit emanates from their capital contribution; and for 
both, neither the capital nor the return is guaranteed.
Here are a few adjustments that we make: 
- The profit should be adjusted for tax purposes such that:
• In those jurisdictions where ÎukËk are treated like conventional 
bonds, the adjustments will be beneficial to the firm. This is 
because the sharing ratio is derived based on net profit (i.e. 
profit after tax); therefore, the tax saving as a result of the 
ÎukËk being considered tax deductible will accrue to the firm.
• In those jurisdictions where ÎukËk are treated like equity, the 
adjustment will equate the adjusted profit to net profit.
- In stock valuation, β (the systematic risk of a firm that cannot 
be diversified away) is considered for adjustment purposes. In 
the same spirit as  β, an adapted adjustment measure α can be 
derived to take into account the difference between different 
firms’ risk profiles within the same industry. Since in this model 
the variable considered is ROE, α would be as follows:
α=
cov (ROEf, ROEi)
Var (ROEi)  
where:
	Cov (ROE
f 
, ROE
i
) is the covariance of the ROE
 
of the firm and 
the ROE of the industry;
	Var(ROE
i
) is the variance of the ROE of the industry.
However, the required data to derive such a measure may not be 
available. Hence, in the remainder of the study β shall be used for 
adjustment purposes instead of α. Even though, β is derived based 
on the returns on stocks and the relevant index, it can be considered a 
good proxy for the purpose of the aforesaid adjustment. 
With this in mind, the profit-sharing ratio λ we derive is variable 
and has an incentive-compatible feature for the firm. Thus, when the 
firm’s return to the capital is equal to the benchmark (i.e. β× ROE
i
), 
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then the equity-holders and the ÎukËk-holders will have equal return 
(as expressed by equation (1)). When the firm’s return to capital is 
higher than the benchmark, the equity-holders will be ‘rewarded’ 
with higher return (as expressed by equation (2)). On the other hand, 
when the firm’s return to capital is lower than the benchmark, the 
equity-holders’ return will be lower than that of the ÎukËk-holders 
(as expressed by equation (3)). These are incentive-compatible 
features in that the firm would be penalized, with a lower share of the 
profit going to the equity-holders, if it underperforms the industry or 
misreports the actual profit. The above conditions can be translated 
as follows:
If    
(1-T)xP
K  = β× ROEi , then:
 
Where 
	T denotes tax;
	P: denotes operating profit as defined above;
	 is the profit share, attributable to ÎukËk-holders, which is such 
that:   
 0 < λ < 1;
	R
s
 is the return to ÎukËk-holders;
	R
e
 is the return to equity-holders.
	ROE
i 
is the return on equity of the issuing firm industry (sector).
	β is the regression coefficient when the firm’s stock return is 
regressed on the relevant index return.
	The remaining variables are as defined above.
- If    (1-T)xPK > β× ROEi,  then Re > Rs (2)
- If     
(1-T)xP
K < β× ROEi,  then Re < Rs (3)
The rationale for these relationships seems obvious. Since β× ROE
i
 
is the benchmark, the returns to the equity-holders as well as that 
of the ÎukËk-holders should be equivalent when the firm realizes 
a result as good as the benchmark. When its performance is better 
than the benchmark, then that can be attributed to good management. 
Therefore, the equity-holders, who are the ultimate responsible 
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parties for the appointment of the management, should be rewarded 
with a higher return as compared to the ÎukËk-holders. In case the 
performance of the firm is less than the benchmark, then the equity-
holders should be penalized for that with a lower return.
An incentive-compatible profit-sharing ratio which permits the above 
relationships to hold can be as follows:
  (4)
 
Where K can be considered as constant over the period and f satisfies 
the following conditions:
- , i.e.  f is an increasing function of ROE
i
. This implies 
that, everything else being constant, when the ROE is higher so 
will be the share of the ÎukËk-holders; and vice versa.
- , f is an increasing function of β. This implies that, 
everything else being constant, when  β is higher so will be the 
share of the ÎukËk-holders; and vice versa. The two relationships 
are justified on the ground that β× ROE
i
 is the benchmark, so 
if anyone of its components increases, everything else being 
constant, that should be translated into a higher share for the 
ÎukËk-holders, based on the previous reasoning.
- , i.e. f is a decreasing function of P. This means that, 
everything else being constant, when the profit is higher, the 
share of the ÎukËk-holders will be lower, implying a higher share 
for the firm, and vice versa. This is a direct implication of the 
incentive-compatible characteristics of the model, as explained 
above.
- For , we have  = 1     (5)
  i.e. when the performance of the firm is equal to the benchmark, 
then  
 ,  then R
e 
> R
s
 (6)
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On the other hand, when the profit is negative, the loss is borne 
according to the capital contribution. Similarly, when the ROE
i
 is 
negative while the profit of the firm is positive, the sharing ratio 
follows the capital contribution. The following summarizes the main 
points above:
 
(7)
Many functions may satisfy these conditions. We have constructed 
the following function, which satisfies the above conditions:            
                                  
   (8)
 
However, in order for this function to be suitable for the model, the 
variables should verify few additional constraints (see Appendix 1, 
for the details of the derivation). Thus the function λ  is as follows:
 
(9)
The following (Monte Carlo) simulation and backtesting will be done 
with this function.
ØukËk mushÉrakah, thus designed, are in a new asset class with 
some features of both debt and equity. Like debt instruments, the 
ÎukËk have fixed maturity, meaning that at some point of time in the 
future the issuing firm has to redeem the ÎukËk. However, in contrast 
to debt instruments, the claim on the ÎukËk is residual, implying that 
the ÎukËk-holders like the shareholders will receive payment if there 
is positive profit.
ii. The Pricing of ØukËk MushÉrakah
The assumption made for this valuation as well as for the simulations 
is that the investors have a long-term horizon and their intention is 
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to ‘buy-and-hold’ the ÎukËk. They liquidate their position only when 
some unforeseen circumstances force them to do so (for instance, need 
for liquidity). This assumption, which is consistent with the prevalent 
behavior in the ÎukËk market, implies that only the future cash flows, 
in the form of dividends and principal payment at maturity, matter 
for the ÎukËk-holders. It has the advantage of isolating the negative 
impact that speculators would have on the ÎukËk price, meaning 
that only the real performance of the company affects the yield. The 
assumption is theoretically well grounded. The prominent economist 
Keynes (1936) severely criticised speculative activities, which consist 
of forecasting the psychology of the market, and distinguished them 
from enterprise, defined as forecasting the prospective yield of assets 
over their whole life. He further maintained that:
Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream 
of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise 
becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the 
capital development of a country becomes a by-product of 
the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.” 
(Keynes, 1936: 102-106). 
With this in mind, the valuation of the ÎukËk mushÉrakah in the 
secondary markets at any point of time before maturity follows the 
same logic as the valuation of stocks (or bonds), which consists 
of calculating the present value of future cash flows. The periodic 
payments to ÎukËk-holders can be considered as dividends in addition 
to the redemption price of the ÎukËk at maturity.  
Thus, the adapted formula is:
  (10)
 
Where: 
PV = the present value of one unit of ÎukËk mushÉrakah;
n = the number of periods (e.g. years) from the date of valuation 
to the maturity date;
CF
k
 = the cash flow at period “k” which is given by: 
  (11)
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RP = the redemption price, which is equal to the initial value of 
the ÎukËk less any loss or plus any value gain;
r = is the required rate of return of the ÎukËk-holders.
It is important to remark that, contrary to the conventional bond, both 
CF
k 
and RP are variable and may be equal to zero.
The identification of risks present in ÎukËk mushÉrakah is 
crucial for a proper pricing exercise. This is because the price of 
the ÎukËk, like any other financial asset, is a function of their payoff 
(i.e. the items in the numerators in equation (10)) and the discount 
factor which depends on the required rate of return r. There exists 
a positive relationship between the risk associated with the payoff 
and the required rate of return. Thus, in conventional finance, if a 
bond is issued by a government with a probability of default close to 
null, the required rate of return r will be equal to the risk-free rate, 
i.e., the lowest rate possible, due to the payoff certainty. On the other 
hand, the investors require a risk premium to be added to the risk-free 
rate to buy a risky asset like a common stock. Indeed, the cash flows 
associated with common stock in the form of dividends (and selling 
price for an investor with short term horizon) are not guaranteed nor 
fixed; therefore, the investors need to be compensated with a risk 
premium for taking additional risk.
Like common stocks, the ÎukËk mushÉrakah’s claim is residual 
and is based on the performance of the issuing company. Thus, we 
shall discuss two types of risk that will have an impact on the risk 
premium, which will be translated into higher r; these are: business 
risk and credit risk. One could further add liquidity risk to these two 
kinds of risk; however, with the assumption stipulating the prevalence 
of ‘buy-and-hold’ in the ÎukËk market, the liquidity risk premium 
is also assumed to be small. On the other hand, the investors could 
require an additional premium already termed as ‘novelty premium’, 
since the ÎukËk are new financial instruments. Such a premium has 
been discussed in the context of Argentina GDP-Linked Warrant 
recently introduced in the market. However, we assumed such a 
premium to be small too.
Business risk is certainly the most serious risk for ÎukËk 
mushÉrakah. Business risk refers to uncertainty associated with 
operating cash flows which are a function of the revenues and the 
expenditures. Revenues depend on the conditions of the economy in 
a specific country and the industry in which the company operates 
as well as the actions of the management and its competitors; for 
Abdou Diaw, Obiyathulla Ismath Bacha and Ahcene Lahsasna
57ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance • Vol. 4 • Issue 1 • 2012
foreign investors, the country risk is also a factor to be taken into 
consideration (Fabozzi and Modigliani, 2009: 455). Given a country, 
the components of the business risk are captured in the mathematical 
relationships showing that the periodic payments CF
i
 are function of 
the profit-sharing ratio λ and the operating profit P. In turn, λ depends 
on the industry ROE
i
, β and P. The conditions of the economy and the 
industry are reflected through the variable ROE
i
. When the economy 
is booming, the ROE
i
 will be higher and the investors will expect 
higher CF
k
 which means higher price or lower required rate of return 
for the ÎukËk. On the other hand, the actions of the management are 
captured by the operating profit P and β. Like the ROE
i
, both are 
positively related to CF
k
, implying the same effect on the required 
rate of return. 
Credit risk is defined, for a conventional debt, as the risk that the 
borrower will fail to satisfy the terms of the obligation with respect 
to the timely payment of interest and repayment of the amount 
borrowed (Fabozzi and Modigliani, 2009: 454). Even though ÎukËk 
mushÉrakah are different from debt instruments in that the periodic 
payments are not fixed but residual, it is important to notice that 
the repayment of RP (i.e., K
s
 less any loss or plus any gain) is to 
be made at the maturity of the sukËk. Therefore, credit risk in the 
ÎukËk mushÉrakah mainly pertains to the uncertainty surrounding the 
principal repayment at maturity.  
It is interesting to note that the pricing of ÎukËk mushÉrakah will 
be made easy by their similarities to common stocks. The players in 
the financial markets just need to make some adjustments to take into 
account their specificities. 
The above discussion pertains to the case where the ÎukËk are 
not convertible. However, a clause of convertibility can be added, 
and a formula for the redemption price needs to be derived. The 
convertibility clause can be included in the contract to prevent any 
opportunistic behavior by the firm that could be detrimental to 
the interest of the ÎukËk-holders. For instance, the contract can be 
formulated so that the convertibility is triggered when the return 
goes below a threshold a number of times. However, in this paper we 
will not delve into the derivation of the conversion price or into the 
specification of the triggering events, as such discussions deserve a 
separate study.
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B. An Analysis of the Model from a SharÊÑah Perspective
SharÊÑah compliance is a necessary condition for any product to 
be acceptable in Islamic finance. Two main aspects of SharÊÑah 
compliance can be identified: 
- conformity to the key SharÊÑah rulings pertaining to commercial 
transactions, such as the principle of mutual consent, the 
prohibition of ribÉ (interest), gharar (uncertainty), maysir 
(gambling) and illicit goods;
- upholding maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah (the objectives of SharÊÑah) 
in transactions, which consist of realizating maÎlaÍah (public 
interest) in the outcome and achieving fairness in the terms of the 
contract. (See Diaw and Boon Ka (2010) for elaboration.) 
Showing the SharÊÑah compliance of the ÎukËk mushÉrakah requires, 
therefore, testing them against the elements in the two aforementioned 
aspects. 
Analyzing the conformity of a product with SharÊÑah principles 
in the light of the first aspect (i.e. key SharÊÑah rulings in commercial 
transactions) can be carried out in two equivalent ways. The analysis 
can be done indirectly by showing that the product is in conformity 
with each of the five elements mentioned under that aspect. The 
analysis can also be done directly by proving that the underlying 
transaction fits one or a combination of SharÊÑah nominate contracts. 
We adopt the latter method as it appears more convenient.
i. ØukËk MushÉrakah: A Fiqh Discussion of Some Issues
MushÉrakah or sharikah is one of the contracts endorsed by Islam at 
its advent. It has been legally justified by the scholars based on the 
Qur’Én, the Sunnah (i.e., what the Prophet said, did and approved of) 
and ijmÉÑ (i.e. the consensus of the competent Muslim jurists) (Al-
Zuhayli, 2003). In the following section we shall address some issues 
pertaining to the counterparty of the ÎukËk-holders, the capital, the 
profit-and-loss sharing and the management.
The Counterparty of the ØukËk-Holders
The classical fiqh books have not specifically addressed this issue, 
since modern corporations as they are legally structured nowadays 
were not in existence during that time. Thus, some contemporary 
scholars have discussed the issue to point out the SharÊÑah position. 
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One of the Dallah al-Baraka Forums, which bring together panels of 
SharÊÑah scholars, has issued a fatwa addressing various aspects of the 
question. Even though the discussion was carried out in the context of 
muÌÉrabah, with depositors as rabb al-mÉl, the rules remain the same. 
According to that fatwa, it is the financial institution, as a separate 
legal entity, which is the muÌÉrib. This is because the financial 
liability does not rest on the shareholders, or the board of directors, 
or the management; rather, it rests on the institution. Thus, a change 
in the composition of the shareholders or the board of directors or the 
management does not affect the relationship between the financial 
institution as muÌÉrib and the depositors as rabb al-mÉl (Dallah al-
Baraka Fatwa No (10/10)). Although from a legal perspective the 
relationship is between the firm and the ÎukËk-holders, financial 
analysis shows a similarity between the risk-return characteristics 
of the ÎukËk mushÉrakah and that of equity. In other words, the 
shareholders, like the ÎukËk-holders, do not perform any ‘work’; 
their entitlement to profit emanates from their capital contribution; 
and for both, neither the capital nor the return is guaranteed, as we 
have already explained.
Conditions on the Capital
The capital is an essential element of mushÉrakah; thus, certain 
conditions regarding the capital should be met for the validity 
of the contract. The majority of classical jurists hold that the 
capital contribution should be in the form of fungible money (e.g. 
contemporary currencies). According to this view, non-fungible 
assets (e.g. real estate) are not eligible to become a part of the capital 
contribution in a mushÉrakah business. However, the MÉlikÊs hold 
a different view, stipulating the permissibility of a partnership with 
capital contribution in the form of non-fungible assets so long as 
their value can be ascertained at the conclusion of the contract (Al-
Zuhayli, 2003: 458-460; Mansuri, 2006: 249-251).
Furthermore, the capital of the partnership should be Ñayn 
(i.e., existent and possessed) as opposed to dayn (i.e., promised 
but absent). The presence of the capital does not necessarily mean 
physical presence at the conclusion of the contract; it is sufficient that 
the asset capital is made available at the time of the transaction (al-
Zuhayli, 2003: 458-460; Mansuri, 2006: 249-251).
Although the issuing firm of a financial security may have 
different classes of assets, it has become quite easy with the advance 
in accounting sciences to provide a fair valuation of these assets and 
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therefore determine the value of the equity capital. In this paper, the 
book value of equity at the time of the ÎukËk issuance and the proceeds 
from ÎukËk issuance will be considered as the capital contribution. As 
shown previously, this is acceptable according to the MÉlikÊs. The 
book value of equity is preferred over its market value as the former 
is generally arrived at based on the valuation of professionals and 
exhibits less volatile behavior. In contrast, market value is influenced, 
in many cases, by speculative activities that impair the accuracy of 
the valuation.
Conditions Pertaining to Profit and Loss
There is consensus (ijmÉÑ) among Muslim scholars that when the 
mushÉrakah business incurs loss, it should be borne proportional 
to the capital contribution. They also agree that profit shares cannot 
be in the form of fixed amounts; shares should rather be in the 
form of ratios. However, they differ whether it is permissible for a 
profit-sharing ratio to be different from the capital contribution. The 
×anbalÊs, the ZaydÊs and many ×anafÊs are of the view that the profit-
sharing ratio may differ from the capital contribution ratio. This view 
follows from the ÍadÊth: “Profits are shared as stipulated in the 
contract, while losses are shared in proportion to capital shares.”9 
To the ×anafÊs, a partner in a partnership is entitled to profit due to 
one of three factors:
- capital
- work/management
- liability for damages (ÌamÉn)
However, if a partner expressly excludes himself from the 
responsibility of work for the business he cannot be entitled to more 
than the ratio of his capital contribution (Usmani, 1999).
In addition to this, some contemporary jurists allow the 
variability of the profit-sharing ratio as a form of incentive to the 
partner. In its fatwa 11/8, the Dallah al-Baraka Forum maintains that 
it is permissible to make the profit-sharing ratio vary as a function of 
time or of the realized profit. For instance, the profit-sharing ratio can 
be set at 10% for one of the partners and 90% for the other in the first 
year, and in the following year the ratios change to 20% versus 80%, 
9 Some Sunan list this Íadīth on the authority of ÑAlÊ; see Al-Zuhayli (2003) for more 
details.
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etc. Similarly, it is allowed, for the purpose of incentivizing one of the 
partners, to set the ratios at, for example, 60% for one of the partners 
who provides work in addition to capital, and 40% for the other. Once 
the return on capital of the latter reaches 10%, the ratios could change 
to 70% versus 30% (Dallah al-Baraka, Fatwa No. 11/8).  
Based on this juristic argument, we have adopted a variable 
profit-sharing ratio between the issuing firm and the ÎukËk-holders, 
which is incentive compatible for the firm such that higher profit 
induces a greater share.10 
Conditions Pertaining to the Management 
It is permissible that the work/management of the partnership be 
carried out by both of the partners or by either of them. It is highlighted 
that what matters for the applicability of the legal opinions pertaining 
to work is the condition of work, not its actual realization (al-Zuhayli, 
2003).
ii. ØukËk MushÉrakah: An Assessment in the Light of
MaqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah in Transactions
The ÎukËk mushÉrakah model meets the first objective of SharÊÑah in 
transactions, which stipulates that the outcome should be beneficial 
to the community. This is because, not only do they allow deals that 
benefit the contracting parties, but also because they do so in a better 
way than many traditional investments. Investment is supposed 
to support productive activities; however, it is not evident that 
many investments in the stock market and mutual funds serve the 
real economy. The ÎukËk mushÉrakah, as designed above, do. The 
proceeds from the ÎukËk issuance are normally used by the issuer for 
10 It is important to mention that even though the profit-sharing ratio is not fixed at the 
beginning, the validity of such as scheme can still be demonstrated. Indeed, some 
Muslim jurists allow selling an item at market price in the future. Wahba Zuhayli, 
in his al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuhu, vol. 7, in the chapter on financial markets, 
reports that ImÉm Ahmad, Shaykh Ibn Taymiyyah, ImÉm Ibn al-Qayyim, and some 
contemporary scholars allow such a transaction. Such a position is justified on the 
ground that this form of ignorance does not lead to dispute. If we remember that 
the conditions for sale-based contracts are stricter than for partnership contracts, 
it follows that the above position of some scholars combined with the principle of 
permissibility in muÑÉmalÉt (transactions) are sufficient proof for the acceptability 
of the way the profit-sharing ratio is determined.
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business expansion that ultimately adds value to the economy. Hence, 
the underlying transaction of the ÎukËk mushÉrakah constitutes a 
maÎlaÍah (i.e. benefit) in that their outcomes are beneficial to the 
society.
The terms of the contracts in the ÎukËk mushÉrakah model are 
balanced. This is evidenced by its risk-sharing characteristics. Loss 
is shared proportionately to the capital contribution and return is also 
shared as agreed by the contracting parties. The incentive-compatible 
feature of the model is of a nature to render any opportunistic behavior 
of the party with more information redundant. This is the essence of 
partnership.
IV.  SUKÕK MUSHÓRAKAH: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The returns to the sukËk-holders as well as those to the shareholders 
in the proposed model depend on many variables such as the industry 
ROE and the operating profit of the issuing company. The results 
of the simulation provide us with an overall view of the return 
distributions. By studying these distributions, we shall examine the 
consistency of the empirical results with the incentive-compatible 
feature of the mathematical model. In addition to this, we shall 
analyze the sensitivity of the returns to the above variables. 
A. Monte Carlo Simulation
i. Method and Data
Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) permits us to obtain the return 
distribution of the model based on various scenarios. It is suitable for 
a What-if analysis by allowing the interactions of the input variables 
within their respective range of values to generate outputs. The 
precision of the results increases along with the number of iterations. 
The error in the estimate of a parameter is approximately proportional 
to , where N is the number of iterations. MCS has been widely used 
in many areas such as option pricing, risk management and product 
development (Bender, 2000:105; McLeish, 2005: 4-7; Raychaudhuri, 
2008). 
In the context of this paper, the profit-sharing ratio as in equation 
(9) will be used to determine the returns to ÎukËk-holders and 
shareholders:
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(9)
And 
Thus, λ and the return functions will play the role of static model. For 
the shareholders, two cases will be considered: the case where the 
ÎukËk are tax deductible and the case where they are not.
As it appears in the theoretical determination of the model, the 
input variables that are likely to have greater impact on the returns 
to the ÎukËk-holders are the industry ROEs, the firm operating profit, 
and the β of the firm.  
We collected the annual ROEs for 16 sectors in Malaysia from 
2005 to 2009. From this historical data, the probability distribution 
for the ROE
i 
is generated. 
Similarly, the operating profits of 16 companies, selected among 
the ÎukËk-issuing companies in Malaysia, were collected for the same 
period. However, the variable of interest here is the distribution of the 
growth rate of the operating profits. This is because the selected firms 
do not have the same size; therefore, what would be important is the 
growth rate instead of the value. Given the distribution of that growth 
rate, the operating profits are set based on the average derived from 
the results obtained by computing the operating profit of a firm as a 
percentage of its long-term liability in the sample.  β is a measure of 
the variability of the returns on a given stock with respect to that of the 
index benchmark. β is the coefficient for the independent variable (in 
this case, the index return) in a linear regression. Thus, we compute 
the annual β for 23 companies, from 2005 to 2009, based on weekly 
data. For each regression, the returns on the Malaysian Stock market 
index, FBMKLCI, are taken as independent variables whereas the 
returns on the company’s stock are the dependant variables. For all 
the above data, the size is determined by the availability of the data.
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For the companies considered in this study the average leverage ratio 
(i.e. long-term debt over total equity) is 38%. In carrying out the 
simulations, we took that ratio as the base case.   
Throughout the simulations the number of iterations is N = 
10,000. The software used for the Monte Carlo Simulation is @ Risk.
ii. Analysis of the Results
In this part we present and analyze the results of the simulations. The 
outputs of interest are the distribution of the Profit and Loss Sharing 
Ratio (PLSR) λ (lambda), as per equation (9), and that of the returns 
to ÎukËk-holders as well as to the shareholders. For the return to 
shareholders, two scenarios will be considered: 
- Scenario 1, where the ÎukËk receive the same tax treatment as 
conventional bonds, which implies tax deductibility.
- Scenario 2, where the ÎukËk do not receive such a treatment.
- For each output we will consider the characteristics of the 
distribution and the most important factors affecting the 
distributions.
λ (Lambda) Distribution
One of the main objectives of the model is to design an incentive-
compatible PLSR that would reward the ÎukËk-issuing firm for good 
performance with a higher share in profit; at the same time, low 
reported profits would penalize it through a lower share in the profit. 
Chart 1 represents λ distribution. It shows that for 90% of the cases, 
λ, which corresponds to ÎukËk-holders’ share in the profit, falls in the 
range between 18.3% and 39.3%, with a mean value of 27.4%, which 
is slightly higher than the share of the ÎukËk-holders in the capital 
(25%). The sources of this increase in the ÎukËk-holders’ share can be 
unveiled by looking into the regression coefficients in Chart 2. 
Abdou Diaw, Obiyathulla Ismath Bacha and Ahcene Lahsasna
65ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance • Vol. 4 • Issue 1 • 2012
Chart 1: Lambda Distribution
Chart 1 shows λ distribution, which is the share of the ÎukËk-holders in the profit.
It appears from Chart 2 that the Operating Profit is negatively related 
to λ and has the highest effect on it. In other words, an increase of 
10% in the profit will cause a decrease of 4.7% in the ÎukËk-holders’ 
share and vice versa. On the other hand, the beta of the firm and the 
industry ROE are directly related to lambda, with a coefficient of 
0.34. These relationships confirm the incentive-compatible feature of 
the model, as explained above. 
Chart 2: Lambda Regression Coefficients
Chart 2 shows the sensitivity of the λ (ÎukËk-holders’ share in the profit) with respect to the company 
operating profit, the company beta and the industry ROE.
 
Thus, the higher profit share of the ÎukËk-holders, as compared to 
their capital share, can be attributed to lower profits of the issuing 
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firm relatively to the average industry and/or a higher systematic risk, 
as measured by beta. 
 
Returns Distributions
Charts 3, 4 and 5 correspond to the distributions of the returns to the 
ÎukËk-holders and to the shareholders in the two scenarios mentioned 
above. (The results are based on equation (9).) For the convenience 
of the analysis and the comparison, we divide the distributions into 
3 regions: 
- A region which corresponds to negative returns;
- A region which corresponds to the top 5% of the returns;
- The in-between region, which corresponds to around 90% of the 
returns.
For all the three distributions the negative returns correspond to only 
4.8%, implying that in more than 95% of the cases the returns are 
positive. 
Chart 3: The Distribution of Returns to ØukËk Holders
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Chart 4: The Distribution of Returns to the Shareholders under Scenario 1
(i.e. Tax Deductibility)
Chart 5: The Distribution of Returns to the Shareholders under Scenario 2
(i.e. Without Tax Deductibility)
The similarity of the probability of negative return suggests that the 
model allows a fair sharing of risk among the securities holders. 
Moreover, this probability of loss has important implications for risk 
management as it provides an indication of the amount of reserve to be 
set aside to protect the capital of both ÎukËk-holders and shareholders. 
As for the positive returns, around 90% of the returns to the ÎukËk fall 
between 0 and 23.7%, with an average return of 11.5% and a standard 
deviation of 7%. The figures of the distribution of the returns to the 
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shareholders in Scenario 2 are close to the above statistics. However, 
for Scenario 1, where the ÎukËk are tax deductible, the returns to the 
shareholders become quite different from those to the ÎukËk-holders, 
with an average return of 12.7% and a standard deviation of 9%; the 
interval [0; 28.9] contains 90% of the returns.
The average return to the securities holders (i.e. shareholders and 
ÎukËk-holders) in all scenarios is of two digits, a yield higher than the 
usual average return on fixed-income securities that carry lower risk. 
This result is in consonance with the empirical evidence, which shows 
that the arithmetic average of annual rate of return of the world’s 
large stocks, over the period 1926 – 2005, is 11.46%, whereas the 
corresponding figure for the world’s bonds is 6.14% (Bodie, Kane, 
and Marcus, 2009: 136). All this confirms the established financial 
theory stipulating a positive relationship between risk and return. 
Chart 6: Regression Coefficients for Return to ØukËk holders
Chart 6 shows the sensitivity of the return to ÎukËk-holders with respect to the company operating profit, 
company beta and industry ROE.
Chart 7: Regression Coefficients for Return to Shareholders (Scenario 1)
Chart 7 shows the sensitivity of the return to shareholders (when the ÎukËk are tax deductible) with respect 
to the company operating profit, company beta and industry ROE.
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Chart 8: Regression Coefficients for Return to Shareholders (Scenario 2)
Chart 8 shows the sensitivity of the return to shareholders (when the ÎukËk are not tax deductible) with 
respect to the company operating profit, company beta and industry ROE.
For all three distributions, the main driver of the returns is the 
operating profit, as is evident in Charts 6, 7 and 8, where the regression 
coefficients are greater or equal to 0.95 for all distribution. For the 
ÎukËk it means that a 10% increase in the operating profit will be 
translated into a 9.5% rise of the return. Even though the profit share 
of the ÎukËk-holders, as measured by lambda, is negatively correlated 
with operating profit, this does not mean that the ÎukËk-holders do not 
benefit from the increased profit. The figures simply put forward that 
an increase in the profit enhances the return to the shareholders more 
than it does to the ÎukËk-holders. This result confirms the incentive-
compatible propriety of the mathematical model.
Furthermore, the relationship between the operating profit of the 
issuing firm and the returns to the securities holders, coupled with 
the loss distribution that we discussed previously, shows that the 
model allows the interests of these stakeholders to move in the same 
direction, by allocating loss and profit in a balanced manner.
On the other hand, the regression coefficients for beta and ROE 
are positively correlated to the ÎukËk-holders’ returns but negatively 
related to those of the shareholders. This result is understandable even 
intuitively, as the product of beta and ROE constitutes the benchmark 
for the ÎukËk-holders. Thus, a rise of that benchmark implies a higher 
share in the profit for the ÎukËk-holders as these two variables are 
directly related to lambda. At the same time, this means a lower share 
for the shareholders in the profit.
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B. Backtesting
The Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) allows testing the model under 
various hypothetical but plausible scenarios. In this part we proceed 
to examine the behavior of the model by employing backtesting that 
deals with actual data. 
i.  Data and Method
Backtesting is a method that permits the comparison of the ex-ante 
forecast from a model to the actual or ex-post realization of the 
variable of interest (Christoffersen, 2008). Backtesting has been used 
in academia as well as in the finance industry to detect possible flaws 
in a model and check the consistency of its predicted properties. The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has endorsed the 
use of backtesting in conjunction with the internal models approach to 
determine market risk capital requirements. Thus, the backtest helps 
evaluate and validate the model being used internationally by banks 
in agreement with the regulatory body (BCBS, 1996; Lehikoinen, 
2007: 24). 
To carry out the backtest, the relevant data have been collected for 
five companies in Malaysia. The companies are: (i) Bina Darulaman; 
(ii) Kwantas; (iii) Nestle; (iv) Sime Darby; and (v) Tenaga Nasional. 
The corresponding sectors are accordingly: (i) engineering; (ii) 
construction & infrastructure; (iii) consumer goods; (iv) oil palm & 
plantation; and (v) utilities. All these groups or their subsidiaries have 
already issued ÎukËk. Again, the size of the sample is limited by the 
availability of the data pertaining to the variables involved and the 
time horizon.   
Thus, the needed data to carry out the backtest are: total equity, 
total long-term debt, the operating profit, firm beta, and sector ROE 
over the period from 2005 to 2009. The results are based on the same 
equations used for the MCS.
ii. Analysis of the Results
A General Description of the Results
With the results for five companies over five years (see Appendix 2), 
we collect 25 observations for each of output variables of interest, 
namely: the return to ÎukËk; the return to equity in both cases, where 
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the ÎukËk are tax deductible and where they are not (referred to in 
the tables Return to eq2 and Return to eq1, respectively). In these 
observations, there are three plausible scenarios that need particular 
consideration:
- Scenarios where the issuing firm performs better than the average 
industry and thus has higher return to capital than the benchmark 
(i.e., β × ROE
i
). This occurs in 6 cases.
- Scenarios where the firm underperforms the benchmark, but still 
has a positive return. These are the most frequent cases, with 18 
occurrences.
- A scenario where the firm incurs loss.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the results of the backtest (The 
detailed results are in Appendix 2). Except for Nestlé, the average 
returns to ÎukËk-holders for the other four companies, over the five 
years, are higher than average returns to eq1 but lower than those to 
eq2. 
Only Kwantas has experienced all the three scenarios over the 
five years of study. In the same period, Nestlé has underperformed the 
benchmark only once; the opposite is true for Bina Darulaman. The 
results of the two remaining companies fall in the second scenario 
where the company underperforms the benchmarks, but still has 
positive return.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Backtest Results for the Period 2005-2009 
Company
Average 
return 
on total 
capital 
(%)
Average 
benchmark 
(%)
Average 
return to 
Sukuk 
(%)
Std
Dev.
Average 
return 
to Eq11 
(%)
Std
Dev.
Average 
return to 
eq22 (%)
Std
Dev.
Bina 
Darulaman
6.52 11.75 7.68 1.16 6.01 0.97 8.4 1.43
Kwantas 7.19 12.75 7.27 7.81 6.75 8.11 9.76 10.24
Nestlé 44.89 27.42 38.36 16.32 47.69 9.52 63.88 11.29
Sime 
Darby
11.47 20.30 11.84 2.12 10.84 2.14 14.65 2.84
Tenaga 
Nasional
6.47 9.34 6.76 1.24 6.15 1.24 10.17 1.79
All the observations are in conformity with the expected properties 
of the mathematical model. Thus, when a firm underperforms the 
benchmark, the rate of return to the ÎukËk-holders is higher than that to 
the shareholders, whereas the latter get a higher return in case the firm 
outperforms. However, this is only true in case the ÎukËk are not tax 
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deductible. If they are, the results are mixed; the difference between 
the return to eq2 and the return to ÎukËk can be as low as -0.81% 
and as high as 32.24%. This result does not indicate a flaw in the 
model; it simply shows how tax regime can impact the characteristics 
of a financial instrument. If the rate of return to eq2 is higher than 
that of ÎukËk in some cases where it should be lower, it is due to the 
assumption that the amount saved as a consequence of the tax regime 
goes to the shareholders exclusively. An obvious implication of this 
observation is that to encourage the issuance of this model of ÎukËk, 
regulatory authorities should adopt a favorable tax regime whereby 
the ÎukËk get a tax treatment similar to that of interest.
On the other hand, to motivate and recompense the management 
and employees for good performance, a share in the profit should be 
allocated to them whenever the results of the company are better than 
the benchmark. This becomes particularly relevant in case the ÎukËk 
are tax deductible.
The average effective interest rate or profit rate on long-term debt 
over the five years differs between the companies, with some rates 
as low as 3.4% (for Nestlé) while others are greater than 6.88% (for 
Kwantas) (See the complete figures in Appendix 2). The results of the 
backtest show that the lowest return to the ÎukËk-holders would be 
6.76% (with Tenaga Nasional), while the highest would be 38.36% 
with Nestlé. But if we recall the difference in risk profile between the 
fixed income securities issued by the companies and the proposed 
ÎukËk, the discrepancy in return becomes normal. Over the period 
1926 -2005, the arithmetic average annual rate of return of the US 
small stock is 17.95% which is much higher than the corresponding 
figure for the World Bonds of 6.14 %, over the same period (Bodie 
et. al., 2009: 136). 
Thus, from the issuing firm’s perspective, the cost of issuing 
ÎukËk mushÉrakah would be higher as compared to debt instruments, 
but at the same time it would mean lower bankruptcy risk. 
An Example of Analysis: the Case of Kwantas
The case of Kwantas is interesting in that the firm has experienced 
all the plausible scenarios. Thus, from year 2005 through year 2007 
Kwantas realized positive profits, but still lower than the benchmark, 
hence the return to ÎukËk would be higher than that to eq1 for all the 
three years, and in year 2006 for eq2. Year 2008 constitutes a good 
one for the company, as it outperforms the benchmark. As a result, the 
return to the ÎukËk-holders (17.08%) would be lower as compared to 
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eq1 and eq2 (17.85% and 24.04% respectively) though higher than 
the benchmark (14.62%). In 2009 Kwantas incurred a loss that would 
be borne by the ÎukËk-holders and the shareholders in proportion to 
their capital contribution.    
The backtest results thus confirm the hypothesized characteristics 
of the mathematical model where the holders of the two types 
of securities face together the risk of incurring loss but would get 
higher return as compared to debt-based securities. Furthermore, the 
model exhibits an incentive-compatible feature in the sense that good 
performance of the issuing firm is associated with a higher share to 
the shareholders, and conversely, low performance–as compared to 
the benchmark–means a lower share. 
C. Hypothetical Example
ABC Berhad is a Malaysian company in the engineering and 
construction business. ABC Bhd won a contract which requires the 
increase of its production capacity by 40%, starting from January 
2012. The amount needed for that is RM 100 million. The company’s 
total equity is RM 400 million, and it does not have long-term 
debt. Thus, raising the needed funds through the issuance of sukuk 
mushÉrakah means that the ÎukËk-holders have a stake of 20% in 
ABC Bhd. The tenor of the ÎukËk is five years. The following is 
additional information based on the estimation of reliable experts:
Table 2: Estimates of the Input Variables for the Period 2012-2016
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Operating Profit (RM 
million)
55 30 64 83 91
ABC’s beta 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.9
Industry ROE (%) 14.5 10.5 12 12.5 14.5
Currently the tax rate is 26%, and it is assumed to remain constant 
over the next five years. The discount rate for the ÎukËk mushÉrakah 
is estimated at 13%. It is assumed that the total capital of RM 500 
million (i.e. RM 400 million of equity and RM 100 million from the 
ÎukËk issuance) will remain constant over the period. Given that the 
face value of a unit of ÎukËk mushÉrakah is RM 1,000, ABC Bhd 
needs to evaluate the present value of cash flows generated by the 
ÎukËk mushÉrakah to determine the number of units of ÎukËk to be 
issued. Equation (9) is again used for that purpose, and the results are 
in the following table.
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Table 3: Results of the Hypothetical Example
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
λ 0.249 0.267 0.217 0.190 0.199
10.147 5.934 10.287 11.670 13.367+100
Using equation (10), the Present Value (PV) is then given by:
 
= RM 89.445 million
Thus, ABC Bhd needs to issue around 111,810 units of ÎukËk 
mushÉrakah, with fair price per unit = RM 894.45.
At any point in time before maturity, the same principle is applied 
for the determination of the price of a unit of ÎukËk.
Even though, for this example, the tenor is short (five years), 
the ÎukËk mushÉrakah would also be suitable for a venture of longer 
term.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have developed an innovative model of ÎukËk for 
companies. The model is based on the mushÉrakah concept and 
has an incentive-compatible feature to address the potential agency 
problem, by making the share of the issuing company in the profit 
positively related to its performance. To measure the performance of 
the firm, the sector ROE adjusted with the company beta is considered 
in order to take into account the riskiness level of the firm. The 
benchmarking against the sector ROE is justified on the ground that 
the mushÉrakah ÎukËk-holders face similar risk to that of the equity-
holders; therefore, they should rightly expect similar return. Thus, 
the profit-sharing ratio is variable in such a way that, when the firm’s 
return to the capital is equal to the benchmark (the firm beta times 
the sector ROE), then the equity-holders and the ÎukËk-holders will 
have equal return. When the firm’s return to capital is higher than the 
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benchmark, the equity-holders will be ‘rewarded’ with higher return 
(as compared to ÎukËk-holders). Conversely, when the firm’s return to 
capital is lower than the benchmark, the equity-holders’ return will be 
lower than that of the ÎukËk-holders. On the other hand, they bear loss 
proportionately to their capital contribution. To further address the 
agency problem, the convertibility of the sukËk into common shares 
is suggested upon the occurrence of some events that the contracting 
parties may determine. The theoretical properties of the model are 
validated using two types of simulations: Monte Carlo Simulation 
and backtesting.
The proposed model of ÎukËk mushÉrakah allows the ÎukËk-
holders to invest in a tradable and SharÊÑah-compliant instrument that 
yields a return higher than what they usually get from the current 
ÎukËk in the market. With its innovative design, the proposed model 
constitutes a new class of financial security with respect to the 
residual nature of the claim and its limited tenor. It thus presents an 
opportunity for diversification. The model also means higher risk 
for the investor as neither the profit nor the capital is guaranteed. It 
resembles common stock in that respect. 
For the companies, the model constitutes a new SharÊÑah-compliant 
instrument to mobilize funds in the capital market. The model would 
mean for them higher financial cost–as compared to debt instruments–
but it would imply at the same time lower probability of bankruptcy, 
since the ÎukËk are equity-based instruments. It is clear that the ÎukËk 
would be a good alternative for those companies which are willing 
to issue new stocks but are concerned about their dilution effect. 
Indeed, based on the pecking order theory, companies preferably 
finance their new investments with internal funds, and then by new 
issues of debt and finally by new issues of equity (Brealey, Myers 
and Allen, 2008: 517). Thus, with the proposed ÎukËk mushÉrakah, 
the companies would have a new option to raise funds that is between 
debt and equity. However, to prevent the moral hazard that can 
arise when an issuing firm undertakes projects with low returns in 
the early years, the option of convertibility of the ÎukËk should be 
considered. However, we have not delved into the determination of 
the redemption price of the ÎukËk in case of conversion. Further study 
is needed to address this limitation.
ØukËk mushÉrakah can also be used by companies not yet listed 
to fund their operations or to finance infrastructure projects that 
generate revenue. This would be pertinent particularly in a Public-
Private-Partnership (PPP) framework. The PPP has been increasingly 
employed for developing infrastructure projects all over the world 
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during the last two decades. The related literature has identified many 
advantages of the PPP concept in terms of risk sharing among the 
partners and increased efficiency in the allocation of the resources 
and the delivery of the services. Indeed, there are inherent risks 
involved in the construction of infrastructure, or its operation and 
maintenance, or its financing. Through the PPP, some of these risks, 
usually assumed by the government alone, are shared with private 
entities. Since, in most cases, return to the latter is linked to the 
availability of revenues from the infrastructure, the private entity has 
incentives to deliver the service in a cost-effective way with all the 
required discipline and competencies (Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, 
and Yehoue, 2006; Engel, Fisher, and Galetovic, 2008).  
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 ويام 25 – 24 قفاوملا , ه 1431 ةرخآ�لا ىدامج 10-11 ةدج يف ةدقعنملا )ميوقت و ضرع :ةيمالس إ�لا كوكصلا( ةودن ثوحب  ]1[
 دهعملاو ،يمالس إ�لا رمتؤملا ةمظنمل عباتلا يلودلا يمالس إ�لا هقفلا عمجم و يمالس إ�لا داصتق إ�لا ثاحبأا زكرم نيب نواعتلاب ،م 2010
.ةيمنتلل يمالس إ�لا كنبلا ةعومجم وضع بيردتلاو ثوحبلل يمالس إ�لا
 ,13 .ع ،ةدجب يمالس إ�لا هقفلا عمجم ةلجم .ةدجتسملا دوقعلا  ءوض يف اهماكحأا و ةصقانتملا ةكراشملا ،دامح لامك هيزن  ]2[ 
 .2001
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1: PROOF FOR THE ADDITIONAL CONDITION ON λ
Additional conditions for .
To avoid negative value on the numerator or the denominator we impose the 
following conditions: 
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APPENDIX 2: RESULTS OF THE BACKTEST FOR THE FIVE SELECTED 
COMPANIES OVER THE PERIOD 2005 – 2009
Results for Bina Darulaman Bhd.
Year
ROE
(%)
Benchmark 
* (%)
K*β*ROE Lambda
Return to 
Sukuk (%)
Return to 
Eq1** (%)
Return to 
eq2 (%)
2005 11.88 5.85 9.99 0.01 6.46 6.95 9.06
2006 14.69 9.70 17.48 0.05 6.14 4.42 5.81
2007 14.72 12.85 28.03 0.22 8.11 6.08 8.40
2008 10.64 12.94 34.15 0.32 8.91 7.06 10.15
2009 11.84 17.42 54.50 0.45 8.76 5.54 8.58
Average 12.75 11.75 28.83 0.21 7.68 6.01 8.40
Std Dev. 1.16 0.97 1.43
Results for Kwantas
Year ROE (%)
Benchmark 
(%)
K*β*ROE Lambda
Return to 
Sukuk (%)
Return to 
Eq1 (%)
Return to 
eq2 (%)
2005 12.59 9.70 54.26 0.20 8.46 7.98 10.96
2006 23.92 15.50 108.58 0.44 5.20 2.86 4.39
2007 24.68 13.62 119.93 0.22 11.84 11.28 15.62
2008 16.62 14.63 148.82 0.14 17.08 17.85 24.04
2009 12.67 10.32 107.93 0.08 -6.23 -6.23 -6.23
Average 18.09 12.75 107.91 0.22 7.27 6.75 9.76
Std Dev. 7.81 8.11 10.24
*  The benchmark is the product: β *ROE.
**Eq1 refers to the case where the Sukuk are not tax deductible whereas 
eq2 refers to the case where they are. 
Incentive-Compatible ØukËk MushÉrakah for Private Sector Funding
80 ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance • Vol. 4 • Issue 1 • 2012
ROE (%)
Benchmark 
(%)
K*β*ROE Lambda
Return to 
Sukuk (%)
Return to 
Eq1 (%)
Return to 
eq2 (%)
2005 12.59 12.95 1429.00 0.18 9.63 9.08 12.39
2006 23.92 22.92 2722.14 0.20 10.79 9.35 12.84
2007 24.68 30.05 3843.55 0.15 12.84 11.09 15.00
2008 16.62 20.08 5100.37 0.13 15.51 14.90 20.03
2009 12.67 15.50 3723.76 0.09 10.42 9.79 13.01
Average 18.09 20.30 3363.76 0.15 11.84 10.84 14.65
Std Dev. 2.12 2.14 2.84
Results for Sime Darby
Results for Nestlé
ROE (%)
Benchmark 
(%)
K*β*ROE Lambda
Return to 
Sukuk (%)
Return to 
Eq1 (%)
Return to 
eq2 (%)
2005 36.62 4.81 30.25 0.10 24.39 42.44 56.63
2006 40.94 5.98 39.85 0.11 26.51 42.86 57.24
2007 42.23 11.96 76.84 0.01 35.43 46.61 60.68
2008 45.44 89.29 462.92 0.01 69.68 66.29 86.28
2009 42.81 25.05 224.26 0.34 35.76 40.28 58.56
Average 41.61 27.42 166.82 0.11 38.36 47.69 63.88
Std Dev. 16.32 9.52 11.29
Results for Tenaga Nasional
ROE
(%)
Benchmark 
(%)
K*β*ROE Lambda
Return to 
Sukuk (%)
Return to 
Eq1 (%)
Return to 
eq2 (%)
2005 10.43 6.91 2984.95 0.65 5.41 4.91 9.09
2006 12.25 9.73 4293.39 0.59 6.79 6.04 10.41
2007 13.50 11.56 5325.67 0.49 9.08 8.52 13.56
2008 10.85 9.29 4407.76 0.48 6.34 5.73 9.05
2009 10.57 9.22 4378.09 0.48 6.18 5.56 8.76
Average 11.52 9.34 4277.97 0.54 6.76 6.15 10.17
Std Dev. 1.24 1.24 1.79
(Footnotes)
1 Return to eq1 represents the case where the sukËk are not tax deductible.
2 Return to eq2 represents the case where the sukËk are tax deductible.  
